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IN THE SUP'REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SOUTHEAST FURNITURE COMpANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
No. 9175

-vs.GRANITE HOLDING C01fPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

REP'L Y BRIEF

Q~F

APPELLANT

The brief of respondent sets forth some matters of
purported law and fact which appellant hereto replies.
Point I
Section 78-24-2(3) U.C.A. 1953, the so-called De,ad Ma,n1 s
Statute, does not Pertain to or Render any of Appellanrs
Witnesses Incompetent to Testify in this Action.

Respondent contends in its Point I that the executed
Oral Agreement creating the joint and reciprocal right
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-vs.-
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of way over· the adjoining lands of the parties is proved
in the record by testimony of witnesses incompetent to
testify under the Dead Man's Statute. The respondent
in support of its contention does not attempt to point
out what witnesses are incompetent nor what testimony
from such witnesses was inadmissable. Further, respondent cites no cases or authorities in support of the
applicability of the Statute.
There are several reasons why appellant's witnesses
and their testimony were not excludable under the Dead
Man's Statute. In discussing these reasons, it should be
remembered that the Oral Agreement was negotiated by
and between the appellant corporation and the respondent corporation acting through their respective officers.
The two principal officers involved in negotiating the
contract, Nephi Hansen for the appellant and S. E.
Sorenson for the respondent, were both deceased sometime before this action was initiated.
1. Where both parties to a contract are dead, the
Statute excluding testimony of transactions with the
decedent is not applicable. Since both parties to the
contract are deceased, the inequality of positions to
which the Statute is directed does not exist. (97 C.J.S.,
Witnesses, Sec. 203, page 646, Atkin's Estate v. Atkin's
Estate, 37 A. 746, 69 Vt. 270).
2. Appellant's witnesses in this action do not come
' within the class of those intended to be silenced by the
statute. The decease of one who entered into a transaction with a corporation does not prevent the officer
2
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of such corporation who negotiated the transaction from
testifying concerning the transaction entered into. The
rule in this regard is stated in 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses,
Section 313, page 191, as follows :
"In the majority of cases statutes making
persons who are parties to or interested in a
suit against the estate of one deceased or a lunatic
incompetent to testify concerning a personal
transaction had with him have been construed as
not rendering the officers of the corporation incompetent to testify as to transactions or communications with the decedent. Accordingly, it is
held that the directors of a corporation, its general manager, cashier, agents, or employees, even
when liable over to the corporation are competent
to testify.''
A similar rule as to agents and employees in general is stated at 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Sec. 309, p. 189,
as follows:
"A statute prohibiting the 'parties' to a suit
against the estate of a decedent or a lunatic from
giving evidence is construed not to include the
agents of parties who are not made parties to
the action;. it is said that to hold that agents are
also barred from giving evidence by the statute
would obviously be adding to its terms. So, too,
under statutes disqualifying a 'party in interest'
or 'person interested in the event' it is held that
the agent is not rendered incompetent as a witness for his principal by the death of the party
with whom he dealt." (See also 21 A.L.R. 928)
3. The respondent does not come within the class
of persons who are protected by the statute. The case
3
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of Beaston, et al. vs. Portland Trust and Savings Bank,
80 W. 627, 155 P. 162, also involved the establishment
of a right growing out of a transaction entered into by
officers of two different corporations, one of whom was
deceased at the time of the action. The case in applying
a statute almost identical with the Utah statute held as
follows:
"Rem. & Bal. Code, Sec. 1211 providing that, in
an action or a proceeding where the adverse party
sues or defends as deriving right or title by,
through, or from any deceased person, a party in
interest shall not be permitted to testify in his
own behalf as to any transaction had by him with
the deceased, does not exclude the testimony of
an officer and stockholder of one corporation from
testifying as to a transaction had by him, as such
officer, with an officer and stockholder, since deceased, of another corporation, from which the
-vvitness' corporation derives a right or title which
it seeks to assert.''
The express terms of the lTtah statute refers only
to natural persons and not to corporations. The Washington court in the above referred to Beaston case acting
under a similar statute points out that the exclusion of
the Statute does not pertain to a corporation. The Court
in that case states as follows:
''Our statute, it will be observed, applies, in
its tenns, only in the case of the death of a natural
person who is a principal in the contract. It makes
no reference to corporations, or to agents of corporations, or even to agents of deceased natural
persons, and to read into it, this further exception would be, we believe, an unwarranted extension of its terms."
4
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A similar rule is stated in the Colorado case of
Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 294 P. 2d, 597.
This was an action against a corporate defendant for
damages from blasting where the corporate president
who directed the work died prior to the action, and the
court held that admitting testimony of statements made
by the president during the course of the operations and
after plaintiffs discovered their damages did not violate
the Dead Man's Statute.
It seems clear that the sole purpose of the language
of the Utah Statute is to prevent the proving by false
testimony of claims against the estate of a deceased or
incompetent person. In other words, it is directed at
conserving the estate of a deceased or incompetent person and, therefore, it is applied only in cases where an
estate of a deceased or incompetent person is involved.
The Statute expressly lists the class of persons protected
by the Statute using the following designations: guardian, executor or administrator, heir, legatee, or devisee
of any deceased person or assignee or grantee of any
of them. All of these designations contemplate the involvement of an estate. Therefore, under the Utah
Statute at least, unless the estate of a deceased or incompetent person is involved in the action, the Statute
would not apply. The following excerpts from the
majority opinion and concurring opinions in the Utah
case of Maxfield vs. Sainsbury,. 172 P. 2d 122 support
this contention :
"The statute's sole purpose is to prevent the
proving of false testimony of claims against the
estate of a deceased person."
5
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''To extend this statutory disqualification to
include a party not suing or opposing the exe.cutor ... would be to totally disrega!d ~he wordill:g
of the statute and its past apphcat1on by this
court.''
''The central and starting point of the inquiry
(as to the disqualification of the witness) being
whether one of the class to be protected, i. e. guard~
ian, executor, administrator, heir, legatee, devisee,
or assignee or grantee of any of them, is suing
or defending."
Appellant's witness, Clyde F. Hansen, does not
come under any aspect of the Dead Man's Statute.
Clyde F. Hansen was secretary of the Appellant Corporation up to sometime in 1945 (R. 88), and was personally present at the time the agreement as to the right
of way was negotiated between the appellant corporation, Nephi Hansen, acting for it, and the respondent
corporation, S. E. Sorenson, acting for it, during the
period of about 1941 and 1942 (R. 85), both of whom are
deceased, but he has not been an officer of nor had any
pecuniary interest in the appellant corporation since
about 1945 (R. 88, 89). In view of this, he cannot be
classified as an interested person, and he would be a
competent witness for the appellant even if he were not
competent under the rules discussed above. The interest
that would disqualify a witness must exist at the time
that the person is produced and used as a witness. The
rule in this regard is stated at 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses,
Section 280, page 178, as follows :
''As a general rule, the existence of the disqualifying interest, within the meaning of the
6
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dead man statute, is to be determined as of the
time the testimony sought to be excluded is offered."
Further, appellant's witness, Mr. Richards, could not be
classified as a directly interested party or person under
the statute. He was merely a witness to a transaction
between both of the now deceased officers of the parties.
(R. 114, 117, 120)
Point II
Counterclaim not Required to be S·e,rved as a Summons.

Respondent's argument under its Point VIII that
appellant's counterclaim was required under Rule 5 (a)
to be served as a Summons in order to be effective and
controlling in this action is not only specious but novel.
This contention is against the universal interpretation
and practice. Respondent cites no cases or authorities
in support of its interpretation of this rule. Further,
Respondent admits that it was actually served and
received a copy of the Answer and Counterclaim.
Under Rule 13, it is compulsory that a counterclaim
which "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim"
must be included with the answer if such counterclaim
is to be asserted at all. Such a counterclaim has always
been considered as part of the answer to be served with
it and in accordance with the procedure provided for
the service of an answer. A careful search by counsel
has failed to disclose any case or authority with a dif7
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ferent interpretation or holding. The only reasonable
interpretation to attach to the exception set out in Rule
5(a) "that pleadings asserting new or additional claims
for relief ... shall be served ... in the manner provided
for service of summons in Rule 4'' is that a plaintiff in
asserting new or additional relief such as might be included in an amended or supplemental complaint would
have to serve such pleading in the manner provided for
a summons.
While a compulsory counterclaim asserts a separate
cause in the action and seeks affirmative relief, it is
only asserted if the cause "arises out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim". Therefore, since the cause in such a
counterclaim is responsive to, grows out of, and is
limited by the subject matter of the complaint, it does
not assert such a new or additional claim as is contemplated by Rule 5(a). It is appropriate to treat it as
part of the answer and require only such service as is
required for an answer.
Further, respondent never appeared specially to
challenge the jurisdiction of the court to proceed on the
Counterclaim. The respondent filed a reply to the
Counterclaim and appeared generally in response to it
throughout the entire proceedings in this case. In fact,
it was the only pleading before the court for trial after
the respondent voluntarily dismissed its complaint at
the beginning of the trial. No objection was made to the
jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the trial on
8
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the Counterclaim, and the respondent proceeded to

defend against the Counterclaim.
The respondent having made a general appearance
to the Counterclaim, he is bound by all of the consequences which followed from the time of the filing and
serving of the Counterclaim, including a default judgment
that had been entered on the Counterclaim.

Point III
App,ellanrs Mo·tion to Amend Counterc:laim and Prayer
to Confo.rm to the Evidence was Gra,nted ..

Respondent on page 3 in its Statement of Facts and
again on page 19 in its argument under its Point X
states that the court denied Appellant's Motion to
Amend its Counterclaim and Prayer to Conform to the
Evidence. This statement by Respondent is not correct.
The Court's Order dated October 29, 1959, and appearing on page 57 of the record unequivocally states that
''the motion to conform to proof is granted''. The
Court, therefore, had before it, in advance of making its
findings of facts and conclusions of law and before
entering judgment, all of the material issues asserted in
this appeal. The record, therefore, supports the contentions of appellant in Points X and XI of its brief that
it \Yas prejudicial for the Court not to make findings
which were responsive to and which covered all of the
material issues raised by the pleadings, and that the
findings and judgment are contrary to the evidence.
9
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in appellant's principle
brief and supplemented herein, it is respectfully requested that the judgment of the trial court be reversed
and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment for appellant, giving appellant and those claiming
by, through, or under it, the right to use the right of
way referred to herein in accordance with the detailed
provisions of the default judgment in the record (R. 17)
or a judgment that such right of way is a public way.

Respectfully submitted,

OWEN &WARD
Counsel for Defendamt
and Appellant
141 East Second South St.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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